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Governments both in developed and developing countries are facing the problem of 
value added tax (VAT) and retail sales tax (RST) evasion. This explains a growing 
interest in policies alternative to the traditional methods of deterrence. This paper 
describes the achievements resulting from a zero cost policy against VAT and RST 
evasion based on rewards. Customers are encouraged to request an invoice by 
changing the invoice into a lottery ticket, thereby making VAT and RST fraud and 
evasion more difficult for suppliers. Such a policy has, for example, been introduced in 
some Asian countries. After having characterized VAT and RST evasion as a special 
kind of public good situation, a theoretical explanation based on behavioral Economics 
models of the success empirically registered by this policy will be discussed. Given this 
theoretical framework, we then introduce an empirical test in order to verify the ex-ante 
applicability of the policy described in different socio-economic contexts. Finally we 
discuss the possible countervailing effects as well as the positive long-term side-effects 
of the introduction of the policy. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
‘When I asked the decorator how much it would cost to paint my house, his answer was:  
“Do you want a receipt?”.’ This conversation, overheard during a Dutch birthday party, is 
an everyday example of an attempt to evade value added tax (VAT).3 The decorator 
would probably ask for a lower fee for painting the house without an invoice as, in that 
case, he would not charge VAT. An invoice enables tax authorities to carry out controls. 
Invoices are, therefore, very important in preventing tax evasion and the illegal non-
payment or under‐payment of taxes. Most VAT and retail sales tax (RST) systems, 
therefore, include the obligation to issue an invoice.4 However, this obligation is not 
always enough to ensure that invoices are actually issued, even if it is accompanied by 
sanctions in case of non-compliance. 
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In addition to imposing sanctions on businesses that do not issue invoices, governments 
can give an incentive to customers to request an invoice and thus obliging suppliers to 
comply. In this paper we discuss a specific kind of reward complementary to sanctions 
and audits to combat evasion of RST and VAT: turning the invoice into a lottery ticket. In 
our discussion we use empirical Law and Economics research as this research field can 
give an insight into the effectiveness and efficiency of such a compliance strategy. This 
paper does not aim to discuss the whole issue of tax evasion and tax compliance: we 
focus on one specific strategy which is applied to increase RST and VAT compliance. 
For a general discussion on tax compliance we refer to the vast literature on this topic: 
Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein even speak of a ‘tide of research on tax compliance’.5   
 
The structure of this paper will be as follows. In section 2 we discuss the traditional way 
governments combat VAT and RST evasion, the alternative approach of providing 
incentives instead of sanctions and engaging consumers as ‘unpaid auditors’ in 
enforcing VAT and RST compliance by requiring businesses to issue invoices. Section 3 
discusses why consumers in certain societies will not ask for invoices to combat tax 
evasion by comparing this to contributions to public goods, Section 4 discusses how 
consumers can be given an incentive to require an invoice, reports the results of the 
implementation of lottery ticket invoices in China and discusses the explanation J. Wan6 
gave for the success of this policy. As we are not convinced by this explanation we 
develop an alternative explanation in section 5 and suggest a model which can enable 
governments to decide on introducing lottery tickets or not. Furthermore, we discuss the 
possible unintended side-effects and some long-term benefits of this policy. The 
conclusion in section 6 summarizes our results. 
 
2. Combating evasion of VAT and RST 
 
Slemrod noted that no government can announce a tax system and then rely on 
taxpayers’ sense of duty to remit what is owed.7 Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein observed 
that the problem of tax compliance is as old as taxes themselves. 8 Webley, Adams and 
Elffers state that VAT evasion is widespread and involves significant revenue losses.9 
Evasion of VAT and RST is not only a problem in developing countries or in countries in 
the south of Europe, but in northern European countries as well. In a report of May 2013 
the European Commission gave an overview of the Actual VAT revenue in 2010 as 
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percentage of theoretical revenue at standard rates.10 The Commission concluded that 
Member States are only collecting around one half of the VAT revenue available to 
them.11 In the December 2012 Action Plan of the European Commission, VAT fraud and 
evasion was identified as an important field in which action was necessary. The 
European Commission shared this view with the EU Member States: “Member States 
also emphasized the need to adopt quickly the pending proposals in the Council and to 
pay particular attention to the fight against VAT fraud and evasion.”12 Such evasion not 
only erodes the income of governments; it also undermines the principles on which 
government expenditure is shared by citizens of a country and, as a consequence, the 
division of the tax burden.13 Tax evaders are free riders: they benefit from government 
expenditures without contributing their share to the government income. If nobody would 
pay VAT or RST, everybody would be worse off as the government would not be able to 
meet its expenses. If a society is of the opinion that government expenses are too high, 
this should be resolved by reducing government spending in a democratic way, not by 
the decisions of individuals not to pay their share of democratically set taxes. Tax 
evasion is therefore undesirable both from an economic and a legal (fairness) point of 
view. It, therefore, makes sense that governments try to combat the evasion of all taxes, 
including VAT and RST.   
 
2.1 Traditional methods: sanctions on tax evaders 
 
Developing effective policies that promote tax compliance and combat tax evasion is a 
challenging task for authorities and policymakers. In the words of Andreoni, Erard and 
Feinstein: “How can an authority – with imperfect ability to monitor - design a taxation, 
audit, and punishment scheme to meet its revenue objectives?”14 Academic research in 
the field of Law and Economics can give useful insights into this problem. Traditionally, 
contributions in Law and Economics focus on monitoring and sanctions to achieve 
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compliance.15 Economic models predict that higher penalties and audit probabilities 
discourage non-compliance, the evidence suggests that higher audit probabilities 
probably have more impact than higher penalties.16 However, Andreoni, Erard and 
Feinstein observed that econometric results suggest that the use of the ‘stick’ to enforce 
compliance with tax laws may not have any long-run impact.17 Tax legislation focuses on 
sanctions as well, such as fines for businesses that do not pay the VAT due on their 
services and supplies. These traditional methods of combating tax evasion are based on 
deterrence, the use of sanctions and punishment  as a threat to deter taxpayers from 
offending. However, enforcing the payment of indirect tax through deterrence methods 
can be costly for the government. Auditing businesses and imposing fines requires that 
the tax authorities have the means and sufficiently well equipped employees to perform 
these tasks. Indirect tax payments are based on the financial records of transactions. To 
establish whether supplies and services have been performed 'outside the books', the 
tax authorities have to do further research. Due to the information asymmetry between 
taxpayers (in economic terms: private agents) and the government, a revenue-
maximizer taxpayer could be tempted to under report the tax amounts due unless a 
costly system of monitoring and sanctioning is in place. Sanctions are only effective if 
they pose a sufficient threat to deter taxpayers from tax evasion. 
 
Efficiency reasoning would lead to setting the sanction at such a level that the marginal 
cost to the government of monitoring and sanctioning taxpayers would equal the 
marginal benefit of preventing tax evasion. Theoretically, Becker suggests that 
increasing sanctions would reduce tax evasion.18 In fact, for a given probability of being 
detected, the expected profits from evasion are a decreasing function of the level of 
sanctions. However, there are practical arguments in favor of imposing a sanction 
ceiling, for example the necessity of preserving the marginal deterrence effect of 
sanctions and the credibility of the threat made by the sanctioning authority. If strong 
sanctions are combined with a low risk of tax fraud being discovered and of miscreants 
actually being fined, these will not be very successful in combating tax fraud.  Hence, 
given the practical impossibility of raising the sanctions level over reasonable thresholds 
- a death penalty for tax fraud, would, for example, not be accepted in most democratic 
societies -, we could expect that high monitoring costs will be associated with high levels 
of tax evasion. Moreover, political constraints could prevent the implementation of 
sanctions. A legislator interested in maximizing his chances of being re-elected could be 
“captured” by interest groups benefiting from tax evasion and reduce the chances of 
effective policies being adopted to combat tax evasion.19 An example seems to be the 
failure (unwillingness?) of previous Greek governments to act on the so-called “Lagarde 
                                                 
15
 Seminal contributions include M.G. Allingham and A. Sandmo. Income tax evasion: A 
theoretical analysis. Journal of Public Economics, (1):323–338; 1972. and  S. Yitzhaki. Income 
tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of public economics, 3(2):201–202, 1974. For a 
survey of the Economics and Law & Economics literature on tax evasion see J. Andreoni, B. 
Erard, and J. Feinstein. Tax compliance. Journal of economic literature, pages 818–860, 1998.  
16
 P. Webley, C. Adams and H. Elffers. Value Added Tax Compliance. In: E.J. MacCaffery and 
J.B. Slemrod (ed) Behavioral public finance, Russell Sage Foundation 2006, p. 177.  
17
 J. Andreoni, B. Erard and J. Feinstein. Tax compliance. Journal of economic literature, 36(2) 
1998, p. 844.  
18
 G. Becker. Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Political Economy, 169(177), 1968. 
19
 G.J. Stigler. The theory of economic regulation. The Bell journal of economics and 
management science, pages 3–21, 1971.  
5 
 
list” of Greeks with overseas bank accounts.20 Finally, in specific segments of the 
population tax evasion could be perceived as a morally justified behavior and pro-tax 
evasion social norms could develop.21 The Dutch decorator apparently thought it very 
normal to offer to do a job with or without VAT. Tax evasion is so deeply rooted in some 
cultures that it could be considered endemic. For example, during the first half of 2012, 
in 38% of the tax audits in Italy (with peaks of over 50% in some provinces in the south) 
the issuance of invoices was found to be irregular.22 These data are confirmed by a 
recent field experiment run on bakeries in Milan.23 Within a time span of 12 minutes, two 
customers bought a loaf of bread in 108 bakeries. Only 73 (68%) bakeries were fully 
compliant and gave a receipt to both customers. This experiment was performed after 
much publicity was given to tax audits in shops in several towns, including Milan, and a 
strong awareness campaign in the mass media. Apparently these campaigns were not 
enough to completely change the attitude towards the issuing of invoices. In such 
situations, any coercive intervention by an external authority could be perceived as a 
violation of the established norm by the targeted population and could produce 
countervailing effects.24 Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that, irrespective of the 
legal and socio-economic context and the effort put into combating indirect tax evasion, 
it is still a widespread problem.25 
 
2.2 Stick and carrot? 
  
The best way to reduce tax evasion would probably be to audit each and every tax 
payer. However, given the limited means of governments, this is not possible. Even 
though the traditional methods of deterrence could only mitigate the tax evasion 
problem, the tax compliance literature has traditionally been skeptical about the 
possibility of implementing alternative policies.26 Nonetheless, some researchers have 
investigated the effect of implementing reward mechanisms instead of sanctions. 
Falkinger and Walther27 show that a mix of sanctions and rewards would outperform a 
system with sanctions only without increasing expenditure for the government. 
Experimental Economics literature has also investigated the effect of rewards compared 
to sanctions in achieving compliance. For example, Torgler found in a field experiment 
among Costa Rican taxpayers that a monetary reward is the most effective way of 
increasing compliance.28 In the report of May 2013 on combating tax fraud and evasion, 
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the European Commission also recommended the use of both sanctions and rewards to 
reduce the size of the shadow economy when it gave the following examples of 
measures to combat tax evasion: criminalizing the purchaser of undeclared work 
(sanction) and the use of monetary incentives to declare (reward).29   
  
Other research outside the traditional tax policy literature seems to confirm the positive 
effects of rewards on motivating desired behavior. Both social Psychology30 and 
Neuroscience31  researchers have emphasized the role and effectiveness of rewards in 
achieving individuals’ compliance. In particular, it seems that punishments and rewards 
have asymmetrical effects on human behavior,32 hence making it possible to reinforce 
compliance through a combination of the two methods.  
 
However, simply rewarding businesses that comply with their tax obligations seems a bit 
odd from a legal point of view. The question is, therefore, whether it could be a solution 
to engage a third party who does not have a legal obligation regarding the tax: the 
customer in the transaction over which the VAT or RST is due. 
 
2.3 Combating evasion by engaging customers: importance of the invoice  
  
In many countries, the invoice is proof of the existence of a taxable transaction. 
Furthermore, it contains information on the amount of tax due. Once a company has 
issued the invoice, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to hide information on the 
supply and RST or VAT due. Hence, a key strategy adopted by businesses in evading 
RST or VAT is not to issue an invoice. If customers demand an invoice, this kind of tax 
evasion is made more difficult. Customers, in a way, act as unpaid auditors for the state, 
enforcing compliance. In a VAT system, other businesses will ask for such an invoice, as 
this is necessary for reclaiming the VAT they have paid. However, asking for a receipt 
has virtually no benefits for individuals who are not taxable for VAT and RST. In fact, as  
will be discussed in more detail in the next paragraph, without any specific policy 
intervention, customers not only do not receive benefits, they could also face high social 
and moral costs when asking for an invoice if it is the social rule not to ask for a receipt. 
 
3 Why customers do not ask for an invoice: framing the request for an 
invoice as a public goods situation 
 
In economic terms, from the perspective of a consumer, asking for an invoice and thus 
preventing tax evasion can be compared with contributing to a public good. A public 
good has two characteristics: it is hard to exclude any person from benefiting from the 
good or the service even if this person does not pay for it (non-excludability) and the 
consumption of the good or the service does not prevent the consumption of it by others 
(non-rivalry). Common examples of such goods are the army and dikes. The non-
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excludability characteristic of these goods implies that it may be hard to get some 
individuals to voluntarily pay an adequate share of the costs of a public good, because 
they cannot be excluded from benefiting from it: the so called free rider problem. 
Therefore, absent external interventions, the free rider problem would lead to an under 
provision of the public good. In this section we will analyze whether having to request an 
invoice could be considered symmetrical to a public goods situation. Economic theory 
predicts that, because of the free rider effect, the supply of public goods will be at an 
inefficient level, below the social optimum. Hence, if the proposed parallel is correct, the 
enforcement of invoice issuance by customers remains suboptimal if the government 
does not provide incentives.33  
 
In order to clarify the concept, consider the situation in which a consumer has to claim 
an invoice from a fraudulent seller. For our purposes, think of the buyer as a potential 
contributor to a specific public good, namely enforcement of tax payments. The rational 
buyer evaluates the private costs and benefits of asking for the invoice. For any 
transaction, the private benefit the individual buyer derives from asking for a receipt is 
almost zero. The customer hardly benefits himself from the tax the seller pays to the 
government. In economic terms: the benefit is not fully internalized by the customer. 
Instead, it is shared with the rest of the population. This is a consequence of the fact that 
goods financed through taxation are often public in nature and, by definition, non-
excludible. The individual buyer and his fellow citizens share the benefit deriving from 
the tax paid in any transaction even if the latter are not directly involved in the specific 
transaction. 
 
On the other hand, not asking for an invoice has an economic benefit if the customer can 
bargain for a discount as compensation for not obtaining a receipt, basically sharing the 
profit deriving from the tax evasion with the seller.  Moreover, even in situations where 
bargaining is not feasible,34 scholars report evidence of the existence of moral, ethical 
and social costs for buyers who ask sellers to comply with fiscal norms. McGee has 
collected two decades of scholars' contributions on the ethical aspects of tax evasion.35 
His book discusses philosophical and religious determinants of tax evasion, explaining 
the formation of pro-tax evasion behavioral norms. The authors argue that, if the social 
norm is positive towards tax evasion, individuals wanting to break these norms will face 
costs. Chang and Lai proposed a model incorporating social norms into a collaborative 
tax evasion agreement between a seller and his customer.36 They found that this 
collusive practice tends to intensify the tax evasion problem and reduces the 
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effectiveness of tax enforcement. Kirchler also analyses the behavioral aspects of tax 
compliance and evasion, focusing on the psychological reasons that lead to customers 
colluding and accepting tax evasion.37  
 
The research mentioned above suggests that in some cultures and societies costs are 
associated with not complying with the established norms favoring VAT and RST 
evasion. While the consumer bears the personal costs and sometimes misses the 
opportunity of a discount in expressly requesting an invoice, he basically gets no benefit 
from this enforcing operation. Even though requesting an invoice would be optimal from 
a social point of view, in the above mentioned social contexts free riding on the 
associated costs remains the individual dominant strategy. Asking for an invoice to 
prevent tax evasion can therefore be compared to contributing to a public good: 
government intervention is necessary, as otherwise ‘prevention of tax evasion’ will 
remain at a level below the social optimum (e.g. a high level of tax avoidance).   
 
4 Giving customers an incentive to ask for an invoice: the Lottery Ticket 
Reward Policy 
           
Given the findings in the previous section, the question is how to make customers ask 
for an invoice. In some countries, customers could face sanctions if they did not ask for 
an invoice. This was the case in Belgium and Italy. In Italy the obligation to issue an 
invoice was introduced in the 1980s. Originally, sanctions were imposed both on non-
compliant business owners and customers. However, in practice it was problematic to 
impose sanctions on customers. The sanctions were strongly criticized by the population 
and the public opinion. The main reason was the high number of sanctions imposed on 
ignorant customers as a consequence of buyers’ mistakes.38 Moreover, customers had 
the troublesome duty of storing invoices for a period of time. These factors generated in 
the population a feeling of resentment against the monitoring authority and not only 
proved ineffective in fighting tax evasion, but seemed even to produce countervailing 
effects. As a consequence, in 2003 the Italian government abolished sanctions on 
customers.39 Similarly, sanctions on buyers that did not request an invoice were in place 
in Belgium for a while but they were difficult to impose, were mainly symbolic and have 
been abolished as well.   
 
An alternative to sanctioning customers is to give them a reward if they ask for a receipt. 
However, it might be rather costly and lead to heavy administrative burdens to give each 
customer a cash reward. Furthermore, if the reward is not high enough, customers will 
not be induced to ask for an invoice. For example, in the 1980s Bolivia tried to 
encourage people to require VAT receipts by introducing a complementary withholding 
tax of 10% on all income, which could be offset against the VAT paid as verified by 
invoices. However, according to Bird it was far from clear that this device boosted tax 
enforcement significantly, one of the reasons being that the stimulus to collect receipts 
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was weak given the alternative of making a deal with the entrepreneur not to pay the 
VAT and splitting the difference.40 
 
Instead, countries can give customers who ask for an invoice a chance to obtain a large 
reward. This is not only cheaper, but Alm et al. show in a laboratory experiment that 
rewarding tax compliant behavior with participation in a lottery increases the rate of 
compliance more than rewarding all compliant individuals.41 In order to implement this 
reward policy, the government starts a lottery. Each invoice issued becomes a lottery 
ticket by way of a serial number that is printed on every invoice. Hence, in order to 
participate in the lottery, customers have to request for an invoice and keep it until the 
final draw. The winning numbers are drawn from all serial numbers and the individuals 
owning the invoices with the winning serial numbers can claim a prize. If the costs of 
organizing the lottery and of paying out the prizes are smaller than the increase in tax 
revenue, the government increases its final tax revenue at zero cost. Furthermore, the 
lottery might have the effect that customers become so used to asking for a receipt that 
over time prizes may decrease in value or eventually be abolished. Thus it could be a 
means of strengthening tax morale in a country. This reward policy is also known as the 
Lottery Ticket Reward Policy (in short: LTRP). It is not just a theoretical approach to 
combating VAT and RST evasion, it has actually been implemented in several countries. 
In the next section we will look at the practical experience of this reward policy. 
 
4.1  The effects of the Lottery Ticket Reward Policy: evidence from China 
 
A few countries have introduced some kind of LTRP to mitigate VAT or RST evasion. 
Taiwan implemented such a reward policy in 1951 which is called the Uniform-Invoice 
Prize Winning Lottery. After the introduction of the uniform invoice system in Taiwan, it 
turned out that firms tended to underreport sales by not issuing an invoice at the time of 
sale. The tax authorities tried to induce customers to ask for invoices with every 
purchase. Most importantly, this kind of behavior was being induced by the uniform-
invoice lottery giving customers the chance to win a large amount of money by obtaining 
an invoice at the time of purchase.42 Every one of the roughly 11.5 billion receipts issued 
annually by Taiwanese shops comes with a unique lottery number, which enters a bi-
monthly prize draw awarding prizes of up to $ 342,000.43 Customers can check on line 
whether they have won a prize.44 This policy is still in place, according to Giebe and 
Schweinzer because it proved so successful.45 Some other countries that have applied 
the LTRP are the Philippines, Malaysia, Chile, Puerto Rico and Brazil. According to 
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Giebe and Schweinzer these schemes have been highly successful in their intended 
purpose of reducing tax evasion.46 Despite these practical experiences, until recent 
years there was nothing more than descriptive statistics and anecdotal evidence for 
these positive results. No systematic analysis was conducted on the impact of LTRP 
implementation. One of the reasons for this might be the technical difficulty in isolating 
the causal effect of a policy introduction. If a policy is adopted at a state level, it would be 
complicated to find a credible comparison. A suitable comparison could be another 
country that didn’t implement the policy but that is otherwise similar to the country that 
did introduce it, but it is difficult to find comparable countries. Cross-country comparison 
results are often considered to be unreliable.   
 
However, since 1998 a peculiar implementation of the LTRP in China makes it possible 
to isolate the causal effect of the policy. At that time, one of the turnover taxes levied in 
China was the so called business tax (BT), a turnover tax levied mainly on specific 
services. This tax was generally collected by local tax authorities. In order to reduce the 
negative effects of widespread BT evasion, the Chinese government started printing a 
lottery number on receipts registering business transactions. The invoice for restaurant 
or entertainment expenditures is at the same time a lottery scratch card. The idea is that 
customers will be incentivized to ask for an invoice and thus oblige the service provider 
to pay BT. Each lottery pays out a prize after some period of time. Once the receipt is 
issued, the seller cannot evade BT on that transaction. Thus, the buyer has a direct 
incentive to ask for the receipt and this indirectly obliges the seller to reveal information 
to the tax authorities. The peculiarity of the Chinese experience is the particular form in 
which the LTRP was implemented. The Chinese State Commission for Restructuring the 
Economic System,47 a Chinese governmental agency, decided to introduce the LTRP 
only in some experimental districts in the period 1998 - 2003 in order to test its effects. 
At first, only some service industries, such as food service businesses, issued lottery 
tickets. As of 2002, the LTRP was applied to other service industries as well. 
Furthermore, the trial area was expanded to involve a growing number of districts. 
Because of this isolated implementation of the LTRP, it is possible to compare relatively 
similar districts with and without the LTRP. Therefore, the Chinese experience is a 
(quasi-) natural experiment. 
 
To the best of our knowledge there has only been one study conducted by Wan that 
investigates the effects of this policy in China.48 Wan estimated that the lottery reward 
policy increased revenues from BT by 17% in the experimental districts. He estimated 
that the ratio between lottery prizes paid by the government and increased tax revenue 
ranged between 1:30 and 1:40. This success induced the Chinese government to extend 
the LTRP area progressively from the initial trial area to the whole country.  
 
Before proceeding, a word of caution on the implementation of the lottery policy in China 
is necessary. Some scattered data collected in China during the experimental period 
show that at the time of the lottery draft the Chinese government paid out only a 
                                                 
46
 T. Giebe and P. Schweinzer. Consuming your way to efficiency: public goods provision through 
non-distortionary tax lotteries working paper, last version 23 April 2013, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=177642, p. 29. 
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 See Note of Mainland China Government by State Commission for Restructuring the Economic 
System, 1989. 
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 J Wan. The incentive to declare taxes and tax revenue: the lottery receipt experiment in China. 
Review of Development Economics, 2010. 
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relatively small fraction of the announced prizes. For example, while the Beijing Local 
Tax Bureau announced that prizes would amount to thirteen million Yuan in 2002,49 ex-
post payments are on average less than 17% of the prizes previously announced. Such 
inconsistent behavior maximizes revenue in one period but, needless to say, would kill 
any possibility of collecting revenues in succeeding periods as soon as customers find 
out that prizes are not actually paid. Given the lack of comprehensive data on this issue 
and the relatively short experimental period, future research should test whether the 
success of the policy in the first years decreased over time. In this paper, we will focus 
on the explanations for the success of the lottery policy in the initial stages, in which 
consumers expected prizes to match those previously announced. 
 
Understanding the determinants of the successful results of the LTRP is not merely a 
theoretical exercise but a key element in effectively replicating the policy in different 
contexts. After having decided to implement LTRP, a government has to commit to pay a 
lottery prize to the winner of the lottery. If the ex post increase in tax revenue is smaller 
than the prize, the government incurs a loss. A theoretical model that captures and 
explains the key factors involved in the LTRP mechanism would provide an indicator of 
the likelihood of success in a specific socio-economic and institutional environment. That 
would limit the probability of unsuccessful implementation of the policy and possibly 
prevent monetary losses for the government.    
 
4.2 Wan´s explanation for the LTRP’s success: saving transaction costs of 
cheating  
 
In an early unpublished version of his work presented at the International Conference on 
Econometrics and the World Economy 2009, Wan tries to explain the success of the 
lottery policy in increasing tax collection through the saving of transaction costs caused 
by cheating associated with a high level equilibrium of tax evasion.50 In the literature on 
tax evasion, a standard assumption is that there are additional costs for a firm that 
evades tax besides the expected costs associated with being discovered and punished. 
Examples of such ‘transaction costs of cheating’ are hiring lawyers and bribing tax 
officials and law administrators.51 
 
Consumers in a standard setting would choose to buy from a tax-evading firm since in a 
competitive market it can offer lower prices than the honest firm. However, Wan 
suggests it is possible to introduce a lottery having an expected value smaller than the 
gain derived from increased tax collection but greater than the difference between tax 
paid by honest firms and the sum of tax of evading firms plus the transaction costs of 
cheating. Such an expected gain associated with lottery participation represents a sort of 
subsidy sufficient to provoke a consumer shift toward honest firms, driving out of the 
market the evading firms. In his analysis, Wan concludes that there is a social gain 
associated with the introduction of the lottery policy which could be achieved only if the 
transaction costs of cheating are higher than the individual costs of asking for the 
invoice. 
 
                                                 
49
 See Beijing Local Tax Bureau announcement on July 17th 2002. 
50
 J. Wan. A solution to tax evasion. Center for Advanced Economic Study Fukuoka University, 
Working Paper WP-2009-09, 2009. 
51
 See, for example, Allingham and Sandmo (1972). 
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Despite the empirical results being convincing and the econometric techniques applied 
appearing to be robust, the theoretical model proposed by Wan doesn't seem to be able 
to explain the challenging success reported.52 First, from a micro-perspective Wan's 
introduction of the transaction costs of cheating excludes virtually every level of business 
- mostly small enterprises and independent workers - for which accountability standards 
are reduced or so simplified that the transaction costs for eventual cheating are zero 
anyway. The example of China, where introduction of a lottery policy achieved positive 
results involving only small service businesses, seems to clash with the assumption of 
high transaction costs of cheating. 
 
Moreover, from a macro-perspective, if the lottery policy could only be successfully 
implemented in the presence of substantial transaction costs of cheating, it would 
confine and limit its applicability to a handful of cases. In particular, it would exclude 
developing countries or countries where institutions and the rule of law are weak and 
where unlawful behavior is widespread and socially accepted. In those countries where 
evading tax is simply the rule, no or very few transaction costs are borne by the evading 
firms. Paradoxically, this is precisely those very countries which would be the most in 
need of innovative policies that would have immediate effect without the need for 
additional public expenditure. Wan recognizes that in some of the provinces involved in 
the lottery experiment evading taxes was actually the predominant behavior adopted by 
almost all of the business population: it doesn't seem reasonable to assume that firms 
were sustaining high transaction costs to conceal a behavior that was so widespread. 
 
While Wan correctly assumes that there is a general fixed cost for consumers to ask for 
a business receipt (that could be thought as a moral cost as well as a cost in terms of 
time or missed discounts) there is evidence that social interactions strongly influence 
consumer behavior in this situation. In a laboratory experiment Falk and Fischbacher 
showed that the level of criminal behavior by individuals is positively correlated with the 
level of criminal activity perceived in the social group they belong to.53 Furthermore, 
Anderlini and Terlizzese show that adding a social interaction component to the 
characterization of individual behavior in trust decisions (e.g. the higher my perception of 
the average trust level in the population, the more I trust others) could account for the 
rising of a multiplicity of different equilibria that capture different trust rates in different 
societies.54 
 
The afore-mentioned studies report evidence that social influence, namely the 
perception of the behavior of other members of the population, affects individual 
behavior. In situations where evading taxes is widespread and socially acceptable the 
cost of asking for a receipt for the individual consumer would be comparatively higher 
than in a place with a lower level of tax evasion. Hence, in contradiction of Wan's 
assumptions, it follows that the higher the level of unlawful behavior in the population, 
the smaller the impact of the introduction of a lottery reward policy. This result is counter-
intuitive and fails to explain the success of the LTRP in China, where high levels of tax 
evasion as well as widespread social norms fostering this behavior are in place. 
                                                 
52
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Review, 46 (4):859–869, 2002. 
54
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It seems therefore that the success of the LTRP should be investigated from the 
standpoint of different micro-foundations. In the next paragraph we will present an 
informal55 model that evaluates the results of the LTRP from an alternative perspective 
which takes into account a taste for gambling and overestimation of the utility derived 
from a possible lottery prize.  
 
5 Cumulative Prospect Theory and the Lottery Ticket Reward Policy success: 
a model 
 
In section 4 we emphasized that the situation faced by a customer having to ask for an 
RST or VAT receipt could be analyzed within the theoretical framework of a public good 
situation. A number of recent studies have examined, both theoretically and empirically 
via laboratory experiments, the performance of lotteries (or raffles) in the private 
provision of public goods. The theoretical contributions by Morgan56 and Lange et al.57  
show that, under specific assumptions on the form of agents’ utility function,58 lotteries 
outperform voluntary contribution mechanisms in the private provision of public goods 
Empirical results from laboratory experiments59 confirm these theoretical predictions.   
In this section we present an informal model that, without imposing any restrictive 
assumption on agents’ utility function form, could explain the success of the LTRP in 
combating VAT and RST evasion. This model departs from the neo-classical framework 
of rationality. In order to explain the success of the LTRP, we will look at the way people 
make decisions. The theoretical benchmark for this is Tversky and Kahneman’s 
Cumulative Prospect Theory (onward CPT).60 CPT is a theory of individual decision-
making under risk and uncertainty that is recognized and well-established in the social 
sciences, in particular Economics.61 It has been developed to capture regularities 
empirically observed in human behavior such as the framing effect, loss aversion and 
the overweight (underweight) of unlikely (average) events that cannot be explained by 
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the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility Theory62 (EUT) traditionally applied in 
mainstream Economics. In short, the EUT hypothesis is that agents making decisions on 
a probabilistic prospect maximize its expected value discounted by risk aversion. A 
fundamental feature of the EUT is that probabilities are linearly weighted. Hence, 
according to the EUT, a rational agent who prefers $800 as a certainty over the prospect 
of $2000 at a probability of 50% will also decline the prospect of $100,000 at a 
probability of 10%, since the two probabilistic prospects have the same expected value 
of $1,000.  
 
Despite its fascinating theoretical architecture, there is empirical evidence that the EUT 
fails to capture certain regularities in agents’ decision making processes.63 Camerer and 
Loewenstein give a thorough explanation of the importance and limitations of the 
Expected Utility Theory: “Expected Utility hypothesis is like Newtonian mechanics [...]. 
Linear probability weighting in Expected Utility works reasonably well except when 
outcome probabilities are very low or high. But low-probability events are important in 
the economy, in the form of gambles with positive skewness (lottery tickets, and also 
risky business ventures in biotech and pharmaceuticals), and catastrophic events that 
require large insurance industries. [...] People are typically averse to risky spreading of 
possible money gains”.64  
 
CPT is important for this paper, because it explains by way of a formal theory the 
empirical evidence that individuals adopt a non-linear evaluation of a probabilistic 
outcome: they overweight the possibility of extreme events and remain relatively 
unaffected by changes close to the average of the probability range. Hence, without 
imposing additional assumptions on the form of individuals’ utility functions, CPT can 
explain why risk-averse subjects would in some cases accept gambles – such as a 
lottery – with a strictly negative expected value. Recalling the examples above and 
contrary to EUT predictions, the empirical evidence suggests that a consistent 
percentage of the population systematically prefers the certainty of $800 to a 50% 
chance of obtaining $2,000 (showing risk-aversion) but at the same time would 
“irrationally” also prefer the prospect of winning $10,000,000 at a 0.001%  probability in 
preference to the certainty of $800 (hence showing risk-seeking, since the expected 
value of the probabilistic prospect in the latter case is smaller than $800).   
 
Now consider the choice faced by a consumer who has to ask for an invoice. Recall that 
the individual benefit from the payment of the tax on the invoice is negligible and that 
costs are associated with the request for an invoice. Consider a government that 
implements the LTRP and announces a lottery prize. Fabbri (2012) shows that, for any 
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feasible prize amount65 offered by the government, the individual dominant strategy for a 
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility maximize agent with any non-negative 
degree of risk aversion, remains not to request an invoice. Individuals rationally (in 
mainstream economic sense) evaluating the probabilities of winning the lottery prize 
multiplied by the prize amount will always find that the expected gain deriving from the 
lottery is smaller than the cost of asking for the receipt. Hence, if individuals behave as a 
Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizer, the LTRP would result in a failure unless it 
is unrealistically assumed that individuals are risk-lovers. Therefore, in light of the 
evidence of the success of the LTRP presented in section 4, it seems that Expected 
Utility Theory is not the appropriate theoretical background to analyze or explain 
individual decision making in the context of the LTRP. The reason is that the LTRP 
introduces a probabilistic situation in which individuals choose over extreme elements: 
extremely low probability of winning a substantial prize. For this kind of situation the 
linearity in probability weighting implied by Expected Utility Theory seems unable to 
capture the correct decision-making process. 
 
Therefore, it seems that CPT represents a more suitable theoretical background to 
analyze the LTRP. Fabbri (2012) assumes the coexistence of heterogeneous types of 
individual in a population: some are expected utility maximizes and others evaluate 
probabilistic prospects through CPT. The author shows that, for a certain range of the 
parameter values describing risk preferences in the CPT model,66 asking for an invoice 
becomes the dominant strategy of CPT-type individuals. The result derives from the non-
linearity implied by CPT. In practice, even holding constant the expected value of the 
lottery prize, in CPT the effects of increases in the prize amount and of reductions in the 
probability of winning a prize do not completely offset each other. An offsetting change in 
prize amount and probabilities would have no effect on the expected value of the gamble 
for an expected utility maximize type. However, for a CPT-type, the low probabilities-high 
prize gamble is more attractive.  
           
Implementing the theoretical framework of CPT allows for making ex-ante predictions on 
the successful implementation of the LTRP. In particular, once some specific information 
on the population of interest has been collected, a policymaker could determine what is 
the minimum number of individuals required to establish a lottery prize sufficiently large 
to persuade CPT-type individuals to contribute.  
 
To proceed with this calculation it is necessary to acquire information on the gambling 
and risk preferences of the population. In practice, it is necessary to generate a 
quantitative description of the agents’ average behavior when facing decisions under 
risk. To be technically precise, it is necessary to calibrate the parameter values of the 
model adopted in describing individuals’ behavior under risk and uncertainty. The 
successful implementation of the LTRP in China does not guarantee that the same 
policy would achieve equal results in a different environment, since it is well known that 
individuals’ risk-preferences greatly vary across societies.  Given that many observable 
(such as income per capita or average saving rates) and unobservable (such as culture 
and social norms) factors are correlated with the taste for gambling of a population, 
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establishing the possibility of a successful implementation of the LTRP in a specific 
environment requires a careful empirical investigation of the characteristics of a 
population. The verification whether a country with a higher level of income per capita 
and different ethical norms than China shares a taste for gambling sufficiently developed 
to implement the LTRP is an empirical issue. In order to clarify how this estimation of 
population’s gambling behavior works in practice, consider the situation in which a 
government wishes to apply LTRP. Before announcing the lottery prize, the government 
will want to check if the policy described in an abstract context will work in this specific 
country. As a first step, a quantitative characterization of the risk preferences of the 
population has to be estimated. Statistical procedures and econometric techniques may 
fulfill this task. While a detailed discussion of these methodologies lies outside the scope 
of the present paper, it is useful to provide some examples. Survey results and field data 
relative to lottery tickets sold could be used to estimate the average part of income spent 
on lotteries and on gambling. Alternatively, it may be possible to directly elicit the risk-
taking preferences of representative random samples of individuals through interviews or 
small incentivized acts of gambling. A detailed discussion of this last procedure, 
commonly used in experimental social sciences, is reported in Holt and Laury.67 
Once a quantitative characterization of the population’s risk preferences is obtained, it 
would be sufficient to incorporate those values into the general model specification as 
reported in Fabbri (2012). Then it can be established whether, given the estimated risk 
preferences, the population of the specific country is large enough to attempt a 
successful implementation of the LTRP.                   
 
5.1 Possible Counter-arguments 
  
The empirical evidence discussed in previous sections and the theoretical results of the 
model presented in paragraph 4 suggest that the LTRP could be an effective tool for 
policymakers to achieve socially efficient outcomes. Nevertheless, a possible counter-
argument is that the policy requires a government at time zero to commit to paying an 
ex-ante announced high monetary premium. However, the effective increase in tax 
revenue only occurs later on. The prize amount initially offered could be seen as an 
investment that can only partially guarantee future returns as it is made under conditions 
of uncertainty. While the policy is founded on a theoretical argument supported by 
experimental and empirical evidence, the practical implementation and design of such a 
reward mechanism in real-life environments could be extremely complex and subject to 
failure. 
 
Moreover, in some cultures there might be a moral aversion to lotteries, which will make 
it politically difficult to implement the policy. When the Belgian Minister of Finance only 
hinted at a lottery system for restaurant and bar invoices in December 2009, it was 
immediately criticized by a Member of Parliament. She seemed to fear that it might lead 
to a gambling addiction.68              
         
Furthermore, the mechanism rests on the assumption that people's taste for gambling 
will not decrease over time. It should be tested if individuals’ willingness to ask for 
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invoices boosted by the excitement about the new gambling opportunity in the periods 
immediately after the reward policy has been implemented are followed by a progressive 
decline in interest (and in the request for invoices) over time. Sustainability of the lottery 
ticket policy in the long-run depends crucially on this factor.69 Bird is skeptical about what 
he calls ‘tax gimmicks’ as the LTRP. In his view the real secret of success lies not in 
such gimmicks but in the more mundane task of establishing a more credible and 
effective tax administration.70 Bird acknowledges that if tax administration is improved, 
then ‘gimmicks’ intended primarily to increase the flow of information to the 
administration may provide some extra benefit, but in his view these cannot take the 
place of improved administrative effort.71 We agree with Bird that improving the tax 
administration is extremely important to improve compliance. However, for countries that 
do not have the means and knowledge for bringing their tax administration up to the 
highest standard, policies such as the LTRP might be of help. 
 
Also, when developing an LTRP, mechanics must be introduced to reduce fraud with 
invoices, such as falsified invoices. In Taiwan new systems of e-invoices which are 
being proposed include the special function of automatically checking whether the 
invoice number matches the Uniform-Invoice Prize Winning Numbers announced by the 
Ministry of Finance.72 Such systems will also help to reduce falsification of VAT receipts. 
Another problem with the Taiwanese system was the fact that as the lottery numbers 
come per invoice and not per amount spent, there is an incentive for customers to pay 
for every single item separately in order to get more receipts.73  A possible solution for 
this specific problem would be paying a lottery prize that is proportional to the invoice 
value. This solution would drop customers’ incentives to pay for each item separately, 
since the increase in probability of winning the lottery due to the fact that the buyer 
collected multiple invoices is offset by the diminished value of the lottery prize. 
 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that targeted rewards may be more effective than 
scattergun rewards. Giving the chance to win lottery prizes to all customers may not 
seem as effective as rewards to specific customers, such as customers who report 
painters who offer them a discount for cash with no invoice. While it is true that this 
mechanism could potentially increase the lottery efficiency compared to LTRP, 
nevertheless, the practical implementation may also bring additional problems. A system 
that rewards only customers who actively report irregular transactions implies that the 
individual reporting the illegal action has to reveal personal data. This could potentially 
restrain customers who want to remain anonymous when reporting illegal actions of 
sellers. For example, in Italy customers can report to the Guardia di Finanza, the official 
monitoring authority, irregularities in the issuance of invoices (in 2012 there have been 
more than 600.000 notifications). On the basis of this information, the authority may 
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decide to impose an audit on the targeted business. While before 2012 notifications 
were strictly anonymous, starting from April 2012 the Italian government required 
personal data from the customer reporting the irregularity. This decision of the Italian 
legislator provoked criticism since customers reporting irregularities could be identified 
and have often been subject to material and moral retaliations. It is still difficult to 
empirically assess the effects of the government policy. However, anecdotic evidence 
suggests that because of it many customers reporting irregularities in the issuance of 
invoices switch from the official Guardia di Finanza signaling system to an unofficial 
website (www.evasori.info) created by a private citizen in order to report tax evasion 
anonymously.     
 
Finally, a special word of caution should be spent on the crowding-out effect of voluntary 
requests for invoices. In some countries, a consistent percentage of the population 
considers it to be an individual duty to enforce the issuance of invoices, even without 
specific laws or monetary incentives. Unfortunately, those customers who regularly 
request invoices may not carry on doing so after LTRP is introduced. There is a growing 
body of literature both in Psychology and Economics focusing on the direct and indirect 
detrimental effects of monetary incentives.74 Those studies suggest that monetary 
incentives directly crowd out individuals' willingness to behave pro-socially. Furthermore, 
these studies suggest that these incentives indirectly affect the proper functioning of a 
norm enforcing mechanism, increasing inefficiency. Quoting Ariely: "money, as it turns 
out, is the most expensive way to motivate people. Social norms are not only cheaper, 
but often more effective as well".75 
 
Investigating this issue, Fuster and Meier set up a laboratory experiment in order to 
verify the presence of the negative indirect effect of monetary incentives.76 In each 
period, participants could allocate a fraction of their private endowment to a public 
account. Money on the public account generated interest that was distributed at the end 
of each period. However, interest and capital on the public account were equally shared 
among all participants, independent of their individual contribution. This scenario mimics 
a public goods situation: while it would be socially efficient for participants to allocate the 
full private endowment to the public account, the individual dominant strategy consists in 
free-riding on others’ contribution. As previously discussed, it is well known that without 
any external intervention, the level of resources allocated to the public account remains 
sub-optimal. However, despite the theoretical prediction of zero contribution, it has been 
shown that a proportion of participants always adopt the socially efficient strategy, 
irrespective of what the other players are doing. A 2001 cross-country studies report 
evidences that the percentage of “altruistic” individuals varies greatly across societies.77 
  
The objective of Fuster and Meier’s experiment is to verify the effect of a monetary 
reward on the behavior of these altruistic participants. When monetary incentives for 
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adopting socially efficient behavior are introduced, altruistic agents did not always carry 
on behaving consistently. Instead, while a number of free-riders started behaving pro-
socially because of the incentives, some of the altruistic agents stopped allocating 
resources to the public account. In the end, the combination of these effects leaves the 
net amount collected on the public account unchanged in the situation with or without the 
private incentives scheme. The possible explanation for this counter-intuitive and 
inefficient result suggested by the authors is the destruction of intrinsic motivation by 
extrinsic incentives and the framing effect of shifting from a social to a monetary context. 
 
Fuster and Meier's results are important for the LTRP. These suggest that LTRP could 
be effective and self-sustaining, leading to a stable, efficient, equilibrium, only if a series 
of fundamental accessory conditions are present. Specifically, it seems that the possible 
crowding out effect of monetary incentives on norm enforcement would not be a problem 
in the case of widespread and inefficient socially accepted behavior, such as tax evasion 
and not asking for an invoice. In situations with established inefficient social norms little 
altruistic enforcing of the issuance of invoices is to be expected without government 
intervention. Thus, a well specified system of incentives could achieve a higher 
contribution level without leading to negative indirect effects.  
 
5.2. Positive long-term effects 
 
Despite the concerns emerging from possible side-effects, there are also positive 
externalities connected to the lottery policy. First of all, imagine the LTRP is introduced 
in a society where tax evasion, in the form of not issuing invoices, is widespread and that 
this behavior is socially accepted or tolerated. If the LTRP is adopted, it is reasonable to 
assume that some consumers will now react to private incentives and will start enforcing 
the issuance of invoices even from suppliers that were used to systematically evade 
taxes. The negative aspects of the social costs of asking for a receipt are outweighed by 
the chance of winning a prize.  
 
Through the historical records of VAT or RST reported by companies, the tax authorities 
can identify those businesses that have an abnormal peak in the period in which the 
lottery policy is implemented. For example, it would be straightforward to implement an 
algorithm that, after controlling for seasonality and business cycles, automatically 
identifies the suppliers reporting a statistically significant increase in supplies and tax. 
Hence, it would become possible to separate such businesses from those that present 
continuous payments of VAT or RST. This signal could be used as an indicator to direct 
monitoring resources towards businesses that report discontinuous trends. Thus, the 
LTRP could be of help in focusing auditing efforts. Businesses that were used to evade 
taxes might even anticipate the increased probability of an audit and will review their 
behavior and increase their VAT or RST payments permanently. As discussed before, it 
is possible that LTRP will turn out to be unsustainable because the increased payments 
of VAT and RST are not sufficient to pay the promised prize. If this happens the 
government will have to incur a momentary loss. However, the benefits of higher 
contribution levels deriving from more efficient screening and auditing and a more 
effective sanctioning system will also produce a revenue increase in subsequent periods 
when the lottery reward option has been abolished.     
 
Moreover, the LTRP may not only be effective in combating VAT and RST evasion, but 
also in tackling the evasion of taxation of business profits. As invoices give an indication 
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of retail sales, these can be used to establish whether the reported taxable profit is 
consistent with such retail sales.  
 
Finally, an additional long-term possible benefit deriving from LTRP introduction is the so 
called equilibria shift in a no pain no gain situation.  Following Parisi,78 we could interpret 
the apparently irrational presence of Pareto-inefficient social norms (consumers 
accepting the evasion of tax by their suppliers) as a point of local optimum that requires 
an initial loss of utility to shift toward the global optimum. To clarify this point, consider as 
an example the release of more efficient software. This new software is not essential to 
perform fundamental operations, but individuals using the old software are slower in 
performing certain minor tasks. Hence, while individuals are not obliged to use the new 
software, sticking to the old one they experience small disutilities that could be 
potentially eliminated, resulting in a Pareto improvement (the “gain”). However, utilizing 
the new software requires a training period during which it is not possible to conduct 
work activities and an initial effort to learn the new code (the “pain”). If individuals are not 
sufficiently forward looking (technically, are characterized by a high time discount factor) 
or don’t have information about the benefits of adopting the new software (are rationally 
bounded), they will refuse to incur the once-and-for-all switching cost to the new 
software and lose the chance of a permanent improvement.  
 
Similarly, a society as a whole could experience a permanent Pareto improvement if tax 
revenue increases and the state can provide better services. The change of a social 
norm fostering tax evasion would be perceived only as a cost in the short run, since less 
cash would circulate in the economy and less competitive businesses would be likely to 
fail. Permanent benefits from a change in the status quo will be experienced only in the 
medium and long run, after the new equilibrium is reached. For example, if the increase 
in tax revenue is used to finance new infrastructure, only after the project is completed 
will individuals experience an increase in utility. The introduction of a lottery reward could 
work as a sort of compensation for the initial “pain” that customers have to experience. 
Once the new, Pareto superior equilibrium is reached, individuals will perceive the 
enforcement of the issuance of invoices as the welfare-maximizing strategy, even if the 
LTRP is suspended.  
 
Moreover, the external shock could lead to more consumers adopting socially efficient 
behavior (asking for invoices) and thus initiate a process of changing the norm. The 
mechanism of social norm creation is often characterized by the so called “snowball 
effect”: an initial group of individuals adopting socially efficient behavior because the 
external incentives might prompt the rest of the population to ask for invoices as well.79 
Even if, after the first prize is assigned, the government cannot repeat the lottery, it is still 
possible that consumers will have already reached the new, Pareto-efficient equilibrium 
and will, therefore, continue to ask for invoices. Asking for an invoice will thus have 
become the social norm. While it is possible that the initial investment and incentives 
mechanism will last for only for a limited amount of time, the positive externalities may 
continue to spread into the future. 
 
6. Conclusion 
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The implementation of the LTRP in China increased RST revenue by giving customers 
an incentive to request invoices, thus reducing RST evasion by businesses. In this paper 
we have tried to explain this result and to provide for a model which might help 
governments in deciding whether or not to implement such a policy to combat RST 
evasion. Risk preferences, social norms and population size have been discussed as 
important factors. 
 
A major concern is the level at which lottery prizes must be set. A well specified reward 
option must elicit a taste for gambling by consumers and induce them to ask for an 
invoice even though this is not an efficient strategy for a rational utility maximize 
individual. Given the peculiar situation introduced by the LTRP (low probability of a 
possible high gain), in order to describe a situation in which agents have to make a 
decision under risk a generalized theoretical framework based on Cumulative Prospect 
Theory has been proposed. This general theoretical framework allows for the testing of 
the applicability of the LTRP in specific contexts.  A key element from a practical point of 
view would be the correct estimation of risk-preferences of the specific population. We 
underlined the importance of this empirical task in order to successfully implement the 
LTRP, since it is well known that risk-preferences vary across populations and depend 
on individual wealth and other factors. Moreover, we have discussed the possible 
positive and negative side-effects.  In order to limit the risk of crowding out virtuous 
behavior, we suggest that the lottery only be introduced in countries with high levels of 
VAT and RST evasion by businesses and a social norm of consumers not asking for 
invoices or only in sectors with relatively high rates of tax evasion, in countries which 
have an otherwise compliant norm. For example, where the LTRP might be effective on 
a more general scale in Italy, it might be best for the Netherlands to limit it to certain 
sectors, such as those involving decorators and the carrying out of other odd-jobs for 
private individuals. 
 
Regarding the positive long-term side-effects, we have pointed out how, in some 
settings, the LTRP could help in deciding which businesses should be audited and that it 
could result in asking for invoices becoming the social norm, even if the policy is 
implemented for a limited time only. The side effect of slightly increased waiting times at 
Milanese bakeries because every customer demands a receipt and less juicy 
conversations during Dutch birthday parties about decorators, will be outweighed by 
such benefits.  
 
 
 
 
